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A Tale of progress and opportunity 
Rob is an excellent and expert radiologist. He is a 
physician who can use a wide set of advanced techniques 
in medical imaging like X-rays, CT, and MRI examinations 
to diagnose patients with many types of illness. Rob is in 
his late forties and many believe he will soon become the 
head of the radiology department of the hospital: when 
he makes a point in a meeting, few would contradict him. 
Many colleagues know that they can rely on him for an 
informed second opinion in case they have to cope with 
a difficult case. Some even believe that he is the most 
talented and knowledgeable radiologist of the hospital. 
For this job, Rob earns a quite good salary: last year this 
was $380,000, which yet is not extraordinary for 
radiologists with his expertise; according to the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, that amount is just the median 
salary for physicians in his position. That notwithstanding 
Rob does not work to get rich. His passion for his job is 
genuine. To become such a radiologist, the competition 
for Rob had been long and fierce: after the high school, 
he had to get accepted for a 4-year university and then 
obtain a bachelor’s degree with excellent medical school 
grades and very high university scores; then he had to 
collect a number of enthusiastic letters of 
recommendation on his attitude and competences to 
enter a medical school as a resident, where he practiced 
general medicine and surgery for one year before 
applying for a further 4-year training program in the field. 
During this latter program, Rob had to interpret, both day 
and night, tens of thousands of imaging studies, while 
also counseling patients and communicating and 
discussing results with his referring colleagues. Over 
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time, his skills became clear and widely recognized at work.  
Specialists like neurologists and orthopedists who refer 
patient to radiologists for digital imaging examinations 
usually disregard the radiologists’ report when they consider 
the resulting images: they also know how to read images, do 
not want to be influenced in their decisions, and above all, do 
not want to reduce the analogical richness of an image to the 
discrete rigidity of verbal labels and ordinal categories 
reported in the radiological report. However, when the 
specialists of the hospital of Rob see that a report has been 
signed by him, they usually read it carefully and consider it 
trustfully.  
Probably also for his reputation, one day Rob was involved in 
a reliability study in regard to the early diagnosis of 
Tuberculous Meningitis (TBM). This is a serious disease that 
usually kills two patients out of three and leaves one patient 
out of two with serious neurological consequences. In this 
study Rob, and other nine colleagues from several other 
hospitals, were supposed to assess a number of CT scans to 
assess and classify the entity of Basal Meningeal 
Enhancement (BME), that is a classic neuroradiologic 
features of TBM2. The results of this study were soon 
published and two particular aspects disquieted Rob. The 
intra-rater agreement (measured by means of the Fleiss’ 
kappa statistic) assessed the extent Rob “agreed with 
himself” on the same CT scan being shown to him twice at 
different times during the day and in a random order with 
other control images: it was fair but not too high (0.55), i.e., 
he agreed with himself slightly more than 2 times out of 
three. However, the inter-rater agreement, that is the extent 
his findings were confirmed by the other colleagues involved 
in the study, was even lower (0.35), just half of the times. This 
2 This situation is inspired by the study reported in: Botha, H., Ackerman, C., 
Candy, S., Carr, J. A., Griffith-Richards, S., & Bateman, K. J. (2012). Reliability 
and diagnostic performance of CT imaging criteria in the diagnosis of 
tuberculous meningitis. PloS one, 7(6), e38982. 
Figure 1. A zebra melting  into a bar code. Artistic picture by 
Nevit Dilmen (2013, CC 0). 
 
result was not a thrashing of the radiologists’ skills and 
knowledge. All the contrary, their diagnosis was still 
considered accurate as a whole, but showing some 
important variability: this could be traced back to a 
number of factors, like the reporting surgeon (and 
probably Rob was among the best raters), the device 
used to display the images, the radiologist’s experience, 
and even the work shift (being agreement lower at the 
end of intense work shifts or by night). The authors of the 
study just commented on this point that the criteria for 
BME assessment needed to be standardized and 
validated in more thoroughly prospective cohort studies 
and that this kind of assessment was worthy of further 
study.  
Some years later, the management of the hospital where 
Rob worked was contacted by an important IT company 
that proposed to provide the radiology department with 
a novel decision support system, called “Zebra Hunter”3, 
a state-of-the-art machine learning system, in exchange 
of the expertise necessary to optimize it and the 
availability for hosting a series of experiments on its 
accuracy and reliability. However, the Zeb (how it was 
dearly called by its designers) was already very good in 
detecting anomalies and relevant traits of digital 
imaging: its accuracy for TBM cases, for instance, was 
90% by means of a complex convolutional neural 
network. The management understood that this 
partnership could bring positive publicity and accepted 
to adopt this system in the idea that it could only improve 
the performance and accuracy of the radiological 
department. Moreover, it was decided that the Zeb 
should be used by radiologists only (and not, for instance 
by the neurologists): expert radiologists, like Rob, had to 
validate any of the Zeb’s suggestions and decide whether 
to integrate them in their reports or not: these reports 
should not indicate whether the diagnosis was 
performed with the aid of the Zeb or without it. In other 
words, nothing should look different at the terminals of 
the department, although patients and physicians knew 
that the radiologists had an extra oomph for their daily 
job. Indeed, Zeb was used extensively and IT designers 
and radiologists worked intensively and closely together 
since its first deployment: its performance improved very 
soon, and its accuracy reached an impressive 98% on 
many types of images, while for others it was 
nevertheless above 85%: glowing figures that tied the 
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best performances by the humans and that were totally 
irrespective of the work load, occasional resource shortages, 
the more or less frantic pace of hospital work. And mood 
swings. 
The vignette can stop here. It already inspires us a number of 
questions. Some high-level questions are often addressed in 
both the Academic and white literature. One question is 
whether Zeb and systems like it will be used (and its bills be 
paid) more to increase hospital efficiency, prolong continuity 
of care, reduce health system costs, or improve care quality 
and outcomes. Moreover: are all these objectives positively 
correlated, or rather incompatible? Analysts also wonder if 
the almost sudden availability in the market of a number of 
“super Rob” (or at least, “tireless Rob”) would cause a 
reduction of the salaries of expert radiologists like the real 
Rob, as well as of the demand by hospitals and hence the 
society for this medical role. As in the vignette above, we 
could think of the advent of a new medical role, probably 
extending the traditional skills of the radiologists, that can 
establish and maintain a trustworthy interface between the 
intelligent machine, kept as a sort of solitary oracle, and the 
rest of the socio-technical environment, that is anyone 
wanting to get access to the predictive services. This new 
radiologist would be an “information specialist”4, i.e., 
someone who could properly feed in the machine and then 
interpret and make sense of its output and still filter and 
process it to make this “collaborative” advice be meaningful 
for the other physicians, the patients and all of the care 
givers. After all, approximately one century ago, this is exactly 
how the professional role of the radiologist was established 
and empowered: as an interface between the new X-ray 
equipment and the rest of the hospital physicians asking for 
the new type of consultation5. Moreover, exactly 40 years 
ago, Maxmen, an influential psychiatrist and professor at 
Columbia University, foresaw and advocated that within 
2025 doctors would be substituted by a new “Medic-Machine 
symbiosis”6 for the better provision of healthcare services. 
However, we are more interested in subtler and more eerie 
questions: for instance, we wonder whether, and how, Zeb 
will affect the decisions of the doctors who use it, including 
Rob. Maybe Zeb would help novices learn how to interpret 
both easy and difficult images; improve the residents’ skills 
more quickly also by challenging them with tricky simulations 
based on real cases; and teach also expert radiologists how 
to solve cases that before its arrival would be too difficult for 
4 Jha, S., & Topol, E. J. (2016). Adapting to artificial intelligence: radiologists 
and pathologists as information specialists. JAMA, 316(22), 2353-2354. 
5 Reiser, S. J. (1981). Medicine and the Reign of Technology. Cambridge 
University Press. 
6 Maxmen, J. S. (1976). The post-physician era: Medicine in the twenty-first 
century. 
a fast analysis and require several meetings, or worse yet, 
further examinations for the patient. Conversely, Zeb 
would perhaps undermine the self-confidence of the 
expert radiologists like Rob, after a few times that their 
interpretation differ from Zeb’s and this latter proved to 
be the correct one. Likewise, it could make the young or 
less brilliant radiologists more lazy and dependent on its 
recommendations. Thus the main point here is whether 
systems like Zeb have the potential to actually deskill or 
“spoil” the physicians in the long run. After all, Rob and 
colleagues know that they can make mistakes, especially 
under time pressure or after 10 hours of work shift, while 
Zeb, also thanks to their daily feedback, has become 
almost 100% accurate on most kinds of imaging. 
Unfortunately, the radiologists know that Zeb will 
misclassify (either in terms of false negatives, or false 
positives) almost one case every day: they cannot let 
down their guard. Zeb is not infallible, but nevertheless 
its opinion must be held in very high esteem, just like 
Rob’s opinion was, and still is, when he is at its best. More 
subtly, we also wonder if doctors will be allowed not to 
follow Zeb’s advice. We are not speaking of a legal 
limitation, as accountability and responsibility will be at 
the human side for a long time still. Rather we are 
wondering whether ignoring Zeb will be socially or 
professionally blameworthy. Being against Zeb could 
seem a sign of obstinacy, arrogance, or presumption: 
after all that machine is right almost 98 times out of 100 
for many pathologies, and no radiologist could seriously 
think to perform better than this. Probably novices and 
young radiologists would restrain themselves from 
defending their diagnostic hypothesis if different from 
the Zeb’s one; but what about the seniors like Rob? Will 
using Zeb, and any similar system, either increase or 
decrease the number of “zebras”7 that doctors will 
pursue whenever they hear hoofbeats? After all, Zeb will 
mention many alternative explanations all together with 
its best recommendation, even those that no radiologist 
would ever think of. Furthermore, how will this kind of 
decision support change the “political” status of 
radiologists like Rob towards the hospital management 
and other heads; the reputation-based hierarchical 
relationships among radiologists; the trust relationships 
between the radiologists and the other specialists; the 
tensions and collaborative dynamics between the IT staff 
and the physicians? Lastly, can we exclude that doctors 
will also use systems like Zeb to practice a stronger and 
more surreptitious defensive medicine, that is to choose 
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for the most plausible option that defends them against 
potential controversies (whereas plausibility is estimated by 
the machine), or worse yet, to make Zeb a scapegoat to 
indulge in excusing both personal and teamwork failures (i.e., 
those related to collaboration and communication failures)?  
We acknowledge and purport the open nature of these 
questions, as well as of any related question that any 
ethically engaged designer of medical technology should 
address. That notwithstanding, we will try to address some 
of them in the next sections. 
Explaining Machine Learning in the Ward  
It does not sound inappropriate to state that “data-intensive 
approaches to medicine based on predictive modeling”8, 
what we will denote in what follows simply as Machine 
Learning (ML) has come to medicine to stay. However, the 
inquiring medical doctor could rightly ask, to go beyond –or 
better yet, behind - common buzzwords: what's machine 
learning? Put in very short terms, it's about learning by 
machines. The medical doctor could then urge: why the hell 
machines should learn? As it is clear to any computer science 
freshmen as well as experienced programmer, programming 
a machine, that is writing sets of instructions to have the 
machine do what we want, is a difficult, often frustrating and 
time-consuming task, which is also prone to many errors: 
thus, as noted by Mitchell9, ever since the first computers 
were built, programmers wondered whether they might be 
made to learn by themselves, that is to improve 
automatically with experience. On the other hand, the idea 
that machines can learn is not that weird if one purposely sets 
aside the common notion that relates learning to knowing to 
adopt the viewpoint that relates learning to the 
improvement of performance. Research on machine learning 
then tells nothing about how people learn, but rather how 
machines can improve their performance over time. If this 
answer did not satisfy the medical doctor above (and she 
would not be entirely wrong), maybe further motivation 
could come from answering another related question: what 
can machines learn? In this case the short answer would be: 
the hidden structure binding data together (and probably so 
the related aspects of the reality that data represent). 
Discovering and making this structure explicit would be 
extremely difficult on the basis of formal logic, symbolic 
reasoning and mathematical modelling, which are all 
techniques that have been mastered by humans for 
centuries. On the contrary, a number of computational 
algorithms have recently proved to be very effective in 
8 Neff, G. (2013). Why big data won't cure us. Big data, 1(3), 117-123. 
9 Mitchell, T. M. (1997). Machine learning. 1997. Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw 
Hill, 45, 37. 
detecting correlations and functional relationship among 
data, especially when these data are “big”. The next 
question would follow naturally in the mind of the 
curious doctor: but how can a machine actually learn this 
hidden structure? Answering this question would entail 
some more explanations, as it regards the very idea of 
learning that is considered in the expression “machine 
learning” and how this idea and the related techniques 
can help medical doctors practice medicine and health 
care.  
Thus, put in general terms, any machine (and in fact any 
system, be it a software program or a human student), is 
said to learn in regard to a task T from experience E if, 
given a performance metrics P (also called objective 
function or scoring function), the latter’s scores 
“improve” over time in carrying out T. A common 
example of P is counting the number of errors done over 
the number of attempts, whereas the system is said to 
learn from experience if P decreases over time. A 
Machine Learning (ML) approach just automatizes this 
process, which is called learning in this specific ambit, so 
that a machine, most of the times a software program, 
can play this game by itself, and improve its performance. 
A sound ML approach regards the optimization of a 
decision model and doing this requires the definition of 
these three things: the task (to learn), T; the experience 
(to learn from), E; and how to evaluate the model, P: just 
a PET (remember this for later). Similarly, Domingos 
(2012) summarizes ML problems as the “combination of 
just three components”: representation (basically of T 
and E); evaluation (i.e., computing P over a 
representation of T to see if it is good enough for some 
practical aim); and optimization (of the representation of 
T to achieve a better-scoring P). In traditional ML 
techniques applied to medicine, the task T is usually 
medical classification (usually applied to prognosis, but 
also to diagnosis and treatment choice increasingly), and 
the experience E is a set of cases already classified by 
human experts. From a computational perspective yet, 
the task T is usually tantamount to the production (or 
selection) of one value, y, (be this either a nominal class 
or a number) from a set of possible values (Y), given an x 
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from an n-dimensional domain X. In other words, T can be 
represented as a functional mapping from X, the data we 
possess, to Y, the data we want to predict or infer from X, i.e., 
a function f so that y = f(x). This mathematical way to see the 
completion of a task should not look odd to a layman, neither 
to a medical doctor. This is is just a general way to see both 
classification and regression tasks, for instance, the diagnosis 
of a medical case or the prediction of a lab exam result. 
Computer scientists like to use a functional representation 
whenever a task can be formulated in terms of the 
association of either a category or a number (the ‘y’) with a 
set of data (the coordinates of a point ‘x’, that describe or 
represent a case on a multidimensional space of attributes or 
features). ML techniques aim to approximate this function f 
by inducting hypothetical functions (a set of f', or the 
hypothesis space) from a limited set of mappings (yi=f(xi)) by 
improving the score of an evaluation function P applied to a 
f'. The set of mappings is what we above called experience E 
(also training experience), that is the “knowledge” that it is 
available in regard to the task at hand. ML algorithms 
(learners) are said to learn the underlying structure binding 
together X and Y, that is the “real” function f. Now, computer 
scientists usually are concerned with the increasing and 
efficient optimization of the classifiers/predictors, that is the 
f’, modelling the above structure. 
The Unintended Consequences of Machine Learning in 
Medicine  
So far so good. In the third and last part of this work-in-
progress we want to focus on the potential unintended 
consequences of using ML in support of medical practice. 
However, we will not consider the consequences of mistakes 
by ML algorithms like those that recently hit the headlines for 
patent discrimination based on either race10 or gender11. 
Rather, we want to focus on the unintended consequences of 
ML at its best, when its accuracy in automatic classification is 
considered at least acceptable or even comparable to (if not 
even higher than) that of human practitioners. This kind of 
exercise is not completely new: A comprehensive framework 
of Unintended Consequences (UC) was developed by Ash 
almost ten years ago12 in regard to health IT and then also 
applied to computerized order entry13. We believe that many 
patient care information system-related errors. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association, 11(2), 104-112. 
13 Campbell, E. M., Sittig, D. F., Ash, J. S., Guappone, K. P., & Dykstra, R. H. 
(2006). Types of unintended consequences related to computerized 
provider order entry. Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association, 13(5), 547-556. 
Ash, J. S., Sittig, D. F., Poon, E. G., Guappone, K., Campbell, E., & Dykstra, R. 
H. (2007). The extent and importance of unintended consequences related 
to computerized provider order entry. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 14(4), 415-423.Ash, Joan S., Dean F. Sittig, Richard 
of the types of unintended consequences considered in 
that framework could also be related to accurate (and we 
emphasize accurate) ML-driven decision support systems 
(MLDSS), especially: “untoward changes in 
communication patterns and practices; negative 
emotions; generation of new kinds of errors; unexpected 
changes in the power structure; and overdependence on 
the technology”. That notwithstanding, here we want to 
introduce some potential ailments that are more peculiar 
of the extensive use of MLDSS, like: empirical anopsia 
and conversational hypoacousia, which both regard the 
representation of the available Experience (E) and the 
input of the MLDSS; probabilistic tinnitus, which regards 
the representation of the outcome of the task (T) and 
hence the output of the MLDSS; epistemic sclerosis, 
which regards the representation of the performance of 
the task itself; metric paroxysm, that regards the very 
way performance is assessed (that is, P); and lastly,  
semiotic desensitization,  judgemental atrophy and 
oracular rush which derive from relying too much on the 
“accurate” output of the MLDSS and its effect on the 
interpretative work of medical doctors. Many of these 
problems are related to a common cause: overreliance. 
This in its turn comes from an excess of trust in the power 
of ML models and the DSS based on these latter models. 
This trust is stoked, on one hand, by the biases that 
Greenhalgh14 dubbed “pro-innovation” and “human 
substitution”: that is believing that a new technology is 
inherently better than anything already in use and that, 
once a task has been automated, the automating 
technology must be as good as, or even better than, any 
human involved in that task. On the other hand, this trust 
is influenced by any kind of literature, both white and 
academic, reporting very high accuracy rates for the 
latest ML implementations in healthcare, ranging from 
80% to 99% [RIF]. This has spread a sort of metric 
paroxysm, that is an ill-grounded trust in numeric 
measures of the performance of ML-based classifiers. 
While the most wide spread metrics of such a 
performance, that is accuracy (i.e., error rate), is 
probably also the most deceptive one (cf. the accuracy 
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15 Valverde-Albacete, F. J., & Peláez-Moreno, C. (2014). 100% 
classification accuracy considered harmful: The normalized 
paradox15), the specialist literature is still looking for the best 
concise way to express a classifier quality and compare 
classifiers: specificity, sensitivity, precision, the F-score (that 
is the harmonic mean of sensitivity and precision), the 
Youden index, the diagnostic OR/DOR, the Area Under the 
ROC curve (AUC), just to mention the most common ones. 
Still too many ways to shoot at a moving target. However, as 
noted by Kuhn and Johnson16 the value of a ML model 
emerges more from a complex trade-off between its 
accuracy and its explainability, which must be evaluated 
qualitatively, rather than by means of a single figure. But 
even more radically than this, the quality of a medical DSS 
should be probably traced back to the improvement of 
outcome and, to guarantee this on the long run, satisfaction 
and ease of the decision makers (i.e, the medical doctors). 
Paradoxically less accurate MLDSS could be better, in terms 
of impact on outcome, than the mostly accurate ones, e.g., 
because the former ones do not undermine the doctors’ self-
confidence or disrupt consolidated team practices (more on 
this later). Value is to be found in the ratio between benefits 
(for patients, doctors, and hospital managers, either tangible 
and intangible ones) and costs, the economic, the cognitive 
and the failure-related ones. In this light, even simple and 
common measures of technical accuracy, like sensitivity and 
specificity, must be taken with caution and possibly seen 
beyond their mere numeric value to be considered for what 
they actually mean in situated and embodied clinical 
practice: e.g., by considering the extent false negative rates 
reassure human diagnosticians about their indispensability; 
false positive rates makes them increasingly mistrustful (and 
hence willing to quit using the system or disuses it, even if it 
brings value); and low error rates make them increasingly 
reliant on the allegedly accurate aid. In particular, 
Parasuraman and Riley17 observed how overreliance on (any) 
technology can lead to either its misuse or abuse. Abuse is 
use irrespective of the stunning lack of evidence base for the 
efficacy and cost effectiveness of DSS in the Dickensian 
world18 where medical doctors work on a daily basis, that is 
the repression of the clues that should instead make people 
wary of the actual capability of technology to really improve 
outcome, a subtype of overreliance that could be called 
information transfer factor explains the accuracy paradox. PloS one, 9(1), 
e84217. 
16 Kuhn, M., & Johnson, K. (2013). Applied predictive modeling (pp. 389-
400). New York: Springer. 
17 Parasuraman, R., & Riley, V. (1997). Humans and automation: Use, 
misuse, disuse, abuse. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society, 39(2), 230-253. 
18 Coiera, E. Evidence-based health 
informatics.https://coiera.com/2016/02/11/evidence-based-health-
informatics/ Accessed on the 06/01/2017. 
overconfidence. However, since prediction  for either the 
better or the worse is always difficult, (especially about 
the future, as ironically noted by Niels Bohr), a more 
blameworthy attitude seems another type of 
overreliance, i.e., overdependance, or misuse. This is the 
use of the technology beyond actual needs, just because 
it’s either more handy, faster or just more convenient. In 
so doing, users can end up by forgetting any contingency 
plan, that is any alternative system that could substitute 
the automated one whenever this fails, is interrupted or 
breaks down. Even worse, misuse can weaken the skills 
(or deskill19) of misusers that are related to the 
automated function in the long run. In particular, we call 
judgemental atrophy the progressive process of 
deskilling of medical doctors in regard to the ability to 
arrive to a sound conclusion and knowledgeable opinion 
by following a process of observation, reflection and 
analysis of observable signs and available data. We refer 
to judgement, because this ailment does not regard only, 
nor primarily, a cognitive impairment regarding 
knowledge and medical competence, but more subtly a 
lack of self-confidence, an enervation of the will to take 
a stance and also, sometimes, even some risk. Thus, this 
UC regards the side effect of any interference of MLDSS 
on the very content or timing of the process of decision 
making, be this either individual or collective in case of 
medical teams, about a clinical case. It is difficult to 
envision how this class of new DSS will affect the 
physicians’ self-confidence, hierarchical power 
relationships or the relationship with patients. That 
notwithstanding, we can inspect this broad phenomenon 
in some more details by distinguishing between empirical 
anopsia, conversational hypoacousia and probabilistic 
tinnitus: the former two regard the input, the latter one 
the output of the models yielded by ML computing. In 
particular, empirical anopsia and conversational 
hypoacousia are sensory defects of the doctors that 
come up by “overemphasizing structured and 
complete”20 data entry and information retrieval with 
respect to a more holistic assessment of the patient’s 
conditions. Let’s see each of these potential 
shortcomings in some more details. Empirical anopsia21 
is a consequence of overrelying on the available data as 
a trustful representations of the clinical phenomena the 
data relate to. While it is undisputed that any sensor, 
including the human eye, is sensitive to only a limited 
amount of the perceivable stimuli, and rightly so 
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depending on what it is considered relevant to take a certain 
course of action, empirical anopsia occurs when there is a 
lack of awareness of the essential arbitrariness of the aspects 
that any data structure and its values depict of a real and 
continuous phenomenon, as well as of those elements of this 
phenomenon that any of its representations amplifies, 
conceals or, worse yet (necessarily), distorts. It is the partial 
“blindness” of considering not only the available data but any 
possible data as a sufficient “proxy” and substitute of the 
phenomenon that these are supposed to render into a 
discrete (often either numerical or codified), transportable 
(mobile) and immutable form22. 
If empirical anopsia regards the intrinsic and -to some extent- 
unavoidable inadequacy of the representation of medical 
cases (broadly speaking), that is of the knowledge base that 
constitutes the “training experience” (E) on which machine 
learning algorithms rely on to build progressively accurate 
classifying and predictive models,  probabilistic tinnitus is a 
more specific condition. It regards the output of these 
classifiers and predictors. As widely known, tinnitus is the 
perception of a ringing noise in the ears that affects the 
perception of external sounds. This noise can be either low 
pitched or high pitched: in the former case we can speak of 
low-frequency tinnitus, while in the latter case we can speak 
of this disorder as acting as a sort of high-pass filter that 
attenuates or eliminates the perception of sounds with 
frequencies lower than the cutoff frequency. Speaking out of 
metaphors, this condition represents the potential harmful 
consequences of two typical ways to present ML results, that 
is either as clear-cut categories or sharp numerical values 
(e.g., normal/pathologic, diagnosis A/diagnosis B), or with a 
ranking of possible resulting classes or values expressed in 
probabilistic terms (e.g., diagnosis A 78%, diagnosis B 10%). 
Likewise, probabilistic tinnitus is a disease coming in two 
variants: when results are displayed in the ranking form there 
is low-frequency tinnitus in that low-probability conditions, 
i.e., the sound of improbable but yet possible the zebras, can 
affect the perception of the hoofbeats of the more plausible 
horses, and hence prejudice the interpretation of medical 
doctors in also considering what, without the DSS, they 
would have never thought of (thus leading to possible 
overprescription of unnecessary diagnostic examinations); 
on the other hand, when results are presented in terms of 
clear-cut categories, high-pass probabilistic tinnitus can 
occur, as higher probability diagnoses simply end up by 
hiding a whole spectrum of less probable but yet possible 
options, thus leading to a form of over-simplification of 
21 Anopsia is a medical term that indicates any defect in the visual field, 
from enlarged blind spot to colour vision deficiencies. 
22 Latour, B. (1986). Visualization and cognition. Knowledge and society, 
6(1), 1-40. 
complex cases that could nevertheless present some 
important comorbidity. Conversational hypoacousia also 
regards the representation of the case but, as the 
reference to the hearing hints at, this ailment relates 
closely to the patient-doctor relationship: it regards the 
fact that doctors using an ML DSS could be even less 
interested (than commonly assumed [RIF]) in the 
discursive element of the symptom reporting by the 
patient, its proxemic dimension, as well as the narrative 
one, as all of these elements are the less suitable ones to 
be fed into the DSS and usually not as much useful to 
enable accurate ML-based processing as structured data, 
codes, and numeric measures instead are. This problem 
closely relates to the following one.  
Semiotic desensitization. With this expression we call the 
progressive decrease of responsiveness and sensitivity of 
physicians with respect to the material, bodily, analog 
and continuous signs of the patient who stands in front 
of them, in favor of the discrete data proposed by 
electronic patient records, registries and decision 
support tools. These data are the measured and digitized 
(that is, often numerical but also categorical) 
counterparts of the patient’s signs, which are produced 
by any kind of automated probe, sensor and device. 
Therefore, semiotic desensitization is a consequence of 
the “quantified patient”23. This tantalizing 
representation of the patient, seen as a set of features, is 
just the “big” amount of data that it is necessary to make 
machine learning tools increasingly accurate and reliable; 
that is to make systems like the DSS the optimal 
intermediary between the actual body of the patient who 
turns to doctors for help and care, and the required 
decisions that doctors have to make on how to intervene 
on that body to solve the patient’s problems. Oracular 
rush regards the attitude by which doctors could tend to 
consult the machine as soon as they can, after collecting 
few elements of the anamnesis and of the physical 
examination, and sooner than a more conservative 
approach, known as “wait and see” would suggest to wait 
for clearer signs and confirmed diagnosis. This could lead 
to overdiagnosis and overtesting, which it is known bring 
negative consequences on the patient wellbeing [RIF].  
Lastly, but perhaps the most subtly dangerous 
consequence: Epistemic sclerosis24 . This is a specific risk 
related to the application of machine learning to human 
                                                          
23 Smith, G. J., & Vonthethoff, B. (2016). Health by numbers? 
Exploring the practice and experience of datafied health. Health 
Sociology Review, 1-16. 
24 In pathology as well as in botany, a sclerosis is a hardening of a 
tissue, usually by thickening or lignification. 
classification: as said above, these are techniques of 
supervised classification that “learn” the underlying structure 
that binds the above mentioned empirical data (i.e., features) 
to their categorical interpretation (predetermined classes). 
This operation is aimed at representing what we can know 
about these things, their functional relation and apply this 
(optimized) knowledge to new observations. Epistemic 
sclerosis occurs whenever this simple operation risks to 
freeze the always-to-some-extent arbitrary, unreliable, and 
idiosyncratic mapping between the sign-data dyad and the 
right class identified by one (or few) observers. These latter 
observers, as widely known but often overlooked in the 
Academic literature, many times just do not agree with each 
other, and sometimes even with themselves: this is the 
known case of both inter- and intra-rater reliability, or 
observer variability. Often in the medical literature variability 
is not considered a problem at all, as long as clinicians achieve 
an agreement and solve opinion conflicts. However, as 
pointed out by25, to decide what the “true” category is on a 
majority basis cannot be appropriate if raters are few; 
moreover, doing it on a consensus basis is not entirely free of 
risks, both in case consensus is achieved after open discussion 
or by anonymous voting. Researchers should consider if 
observer variability is not related to an intrinsic ambiguity of 
the phenomena observed, rather than to an interpretative 
deficiency. However, the impact of observer variability on ML 
cannot be overestimated. Indeed, a ML approach risk to 
freeze into the decision model two serious and often 
neglected biases: selection bias, occurring when training data 
(the above experience E) are not fully representative of the 
natural case variety due to sampling and sample size; and 
classification bias, occurring when the single categories 
associated by the raters to the training data oversimplify 
borderline cases (i.e., cases for which the observers do not 
agree, or could not reach an agreement), or when the raters 
misclassify the cases (for any reason). In both cases, the 
decision model would surreptitiously embed biases, mistakes 
and discriminations and, worse yet, even reiterate and 
reinforce them on the new cases processed. If ML specialists 
were more aware of this, they could become more wary of 
classifications where the original data present relevant inter- 
or intra-rater disagreements. In those cases, MLDSS designers 
could explore the opportunity to transform dichotomous 
values into a multi-class range of four values: a 1/0 domain 
(e.g., pathological vs. normal) could be transformed into one 
including the following values: 1, 0, 1-and-0 and even a “mu”26 
25 Svensson, C. M., Hübler, R., & Figge, M. T. (2015). Automated 
Classification of Circulating Tumor Cells and the Impact of Interobsever 
Variability on Classifier Training and Performance. Journal of immunology 
research, 2015. 
26 "Mu" may be used similarly to "N/A" or "not applicable," following the 
popular interpretation by Robert Pirsig and Douglas Hofstadter of the 
value. The former case could be used when an even 
number of raters could choose one option instead of the 
other; the latter could be used whenever clinicians 
recognized cases that are really borderline and that could 
not be settled on the basis of a majority-based consensus. 
What ML specialists often ignore is that many times 
physicians reach diagnosis on a “best guess” basis and 
likely according to elements that either are not 
represented properly in the available data nor 
represented at all. Thus the mapping between training 
experience (E) is fraught with an uncertainty that current 
ML algorithms just do not address. Thus, accepting that 
reality can be difficult if not impossible to be classified can 
be key when a black-box model of ML risks to freeze a 
forcedly orderly association between data and their 
“standard” interpretation and make doctors more careful 
in their judicious decisions. In regard to the black-boxness 
of ML models, this is often considered the problem of the 
use of ML in DS. It is argued that MLDSS should not be 
evaluated only in terms of accuracy (i.e., error rates), but 
also in terms of interpretability, in primis by the doctor 
enacting the decision. This latter dimension is much 
harder to assess, and various synonyms have been 
proposed: explainability, intelligibility, transparency, 
understandability27. Ironically enough, the more the 
models take biological-inspired names (e.g., random 
forests, neural networks), the less understandable the 
mapping28, not only for doctors and laymen, in general, 
but also for the engineers themselves. The point is not 
that MLDSS do not give explanations for their 
suggestions: after all these explanations could be either 
selected from a predefined set or composed ad-hoc by a 
further automatic mapping. The problem rather lies in the 
impossibility for the doctor to “open” the black box and 
uderstand why certain classes should be associated to 
certain patient features, let alone “try” himself (like in a 
sort of simulation) the mapping between a case and the 
most appropriate decision instead of having to rely on 
blind faith. Paradoxically, what in a human context could 
be said to relate to creativity, ingenuity and intuitivity29, 
in a MLDSS context could be seen as a problem of opacity 
and, worse yet, ill-grounded trust, i.e., trust on the 
capabilities of an actual “Clever Hans horse”30, rather 
than on a reliable decision companion. Overfitting models 
                                                          
famous Zen Buddhism koan whenever categorical thinking is 
considered to be an unnecessary stretch or even a delusion. To this 
respect we also recall the famous Tao Te Ching saying:  "The five 
colors [that is thinking of colors in terms of only five linguistic 
categories] make man's eyes blind" (cf. Lecture on Zen by Alan Watts) 
27 Lipton, Z. C. (2016). The mythos of model interpretability. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1606.03490. 
28 Carstensen, J. (2016) Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently 
Inscrutable? Despite new biology-like tools, some insist interpretation 
(that is models very well trained on a sample of all possible 
data that yet do not properly represent the whole population) 
could be “horses” that are much better in getting their carrot 
than helping their master do math.  
Conclusions 
Obviously the risky consequences mentioned above should 
not be taken as disjoint categories and indeed we see them 
as strongly correlated and mutually affecting, leading to 
known phenomena like overdiagnosis, overtesting and 
overprescription, but also distreatment (i.e., avoiding risky 
treatments for a sort of defensive medicine) and obviously 
misdiagnosing (mistaking the diagnosis before contrary 
evidence). We conjecture that many times their coexistence 
can let even paradoxical phenomena emerge. For instance 
very accurate MLDSSs could, in the long term, deskill those 
who are supposed to maintain, and update them. Deskilling 
could negatively affect their ability to interpret and classify 
new images (cf. semiotic desensitization) that regular 
maintenance would require to feed into the systems as 
training data to increase their accuracy. The paradox lies in 
the fact that these systems that undermine the skills of their 
janitors could become less and less accurate over time, 
although fewer and fewer people could recognize this by that 
time31. 
Those risks can be considered typical of a new generation of 
accurate decision support systems, as they are related to 
their very essence: DSS are systems designed to help doctors 
take decisions, that is make up their mind by “cutting off” 
(quite literally) the unlikely and inappropriate options, so that 
the best ones remain and can be selected and executed. 
These systems are then aids of optimal option selection, 
among the alternatives that have been predefined in some 
theoretical model, according to more or less explicit data-
driven conditions. Here suffice to hint at the idea that 
adopting a “choice support system”, rather than a DSS, would 
entail a completely different mindset: whereas choice 
denotes “the right, power, or opportunity to choose”, such a 
system would be aimed at helping physicians have a 
perception of what the right or wrong choice may be, 
pondering the odds and risks, being free to choose what, to 
the best of her knowledge and beliefs, she deems better for 
is impossible. nautil.us/issue/40. http://nautil.us/issue/40/learning/is-
artificial-intelligence-permanently-inscrutable. Accessed 01/26/2017. 
Archived at http://archive.is/geMja. 
29 after all doctors are not supposed, or maybe just should not always be 
supposed, to say why they feel that a certain decision is more appropriate. 
30 B. L. Sturm, “A simple method to determine if a music information 
retrieval system is a 'horse',” IEEE Trans. Multimedia 16(6):1636–1644, 
2014. 
31 personal communication with Mireille Hildebrandt, 2016.  
the patient at hand, according to the latter’s needs and 
wishes. 
As noted by Neff (2013, cit.), the biggest challenge for the 
use of ML in health care is social, not technical. The 
challenge is still to understand how people, both patients 
and providers, will actually embed automated 
classifications and prediction into practice. In this light, 
to consider the potential consequences of machine 
learning like fanciful diseases is not just a way to dispel 
with irony the odds of their occurrence. More than that, 
it is a metaphoric way to suggest that, like with biological 
disease, we can produce the necessary antibodies to 
fight these potential shortcomings related to the 
application of new predictive technologies to medicine, 
and that prevention, based on better knowledge and 
awareness, is far better than cure. Thus, far from being a 
Cassandra’s exercise, or worse yet, of any neo-luddite, 
the research on the unintended consequences of any 
technology adoption finds its most natural justification 
on the raising of awareness by a larger portion of its 
prospective users and a better sensitivity on the 
connected nature of sociotechnical settings: that is the 
awareness that if you change something, even a small 
thing in a process, unexpected and uncontrolled changes 
can spread to elements that one could not suspect to be 
connected together: this seems particularly true 
especially in those settings where technology can act as 
a third actor coming between doctors and patients32, 
thus affecting the quality and function of this 
relationships between humans. We believe that the 
prudent attitude of a UC research can reduce the odds of 
the negative consequences. If these latter ones, right in 
virtue of their unexpectedness, occur all our efforts 
notwithstanding, UC research can help us manage them 
and reduce their impact. 
In addition to a prevident attitude, UC research can also 
inspire a different approach to health IT design. Inspired 
by this approach, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness of 
some tentative (technological) antidote. In particular, we 
are investigating if visualization tools33 that provide 
doctors with alternative, visual, number-less (i.e., 
analogical) representations of the patient’s conditions 
and perceptions, illness evolution and treatment risks 
(see Figure 2) could support their choices and also get 
them more wary of the validity of clear-cut categories 
                                                          
32 Swinglehurst, D., Roberts, C., & Greenhalgh, T. (2011). Opening up 
the 'black box' of the electronic patient record: A linguistic 
ethnographic study in general practice. Communication & medicine, 
8(1), 3. 
33 Cabitza, F., Locoro, A., Fogli, D., & Giacomin, M. (2016). Valuable 
Visualization of Healthcare Information: From the Quantified Self Data 
and quantitative numbers. In so doing, we also aim to 
reinforce the idea that medical practice is primarily still an 
“art and science of the signs”.  
Exactly two hundred years ago, Lander-Beauvais34 conceived 
and proposed to his colleagues this vision of what medicine 
should be. Now we are wondering if it is important to 
preserve such a vision, in this age in which machines learn 
how to datafy medical signs better and faster than any 
brilliant student in a Medical School, actually can learn to 
interpret them. 
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Figure 2: Examples of choice-aiding visualizations: (from top left, 
in clockwise direction) a rhesiogram, that is a graphical 
representation of how basic emotions (like anger, fear, trust, 
sadness and joy) unfold in the patient’s writings; a picture to 
render the risk associated with blood pressure (from 
www.vizhealth.org); a parallel coordinate diagram showing 
multivariate patient attributes. 
